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Comments
FROM PREFERRED CARRIER TO COMMON
CARRIER: CHANGES IN THE LIABILITY RULES
FOR LOST, DAMAGED, OR DELAYED FREIGHT
Guy H. KERR
By recent investigation order,' the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) completed its first overall examination of air carrier rules
and practices concerning liability for air freight damage, loss, or
delay. Initially ordered in 1970,' the investigation was not intended
to be as comprehensive as it became. The scope of the investigation
was broadened four times before the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) handed down his Initial Decision' in 1973. In that decision,
the ALJ found air carrier rules and practices illegal in many
respects and suggested changes which radically departed from
prior rules of liability. As a result, the CAB on its own motion
ordered a review of the Initial Decision.' The CAB's conclusions
represent the first comprehensive look at the liability rules and
practices of the air transportation industry. Because the measures
prescribed therein will likely have an effect on this particular phase
of air carrier service, this Comment will trace the development of
common carrier liability in an effort to conclude what type of
impact the CAB's recent Liability Investigation will have on the
present-day air carrier as it attempts to provide better freight and
baggage services at lower rates.
'Liability and Claims Rules and Practices Investigation, CAB Docket No.
19,923 et al., Order Serial No. 76-3-139 (Mar. 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Liability Investigation].
' See CAB Order No. 70-7-121 (July 24, 1970).
'See CAB Order No. 70-9-159 (Sept. 30, 1970); CAB Order No. 71-3-108
(Mar. 18, 1971); CAB Order No. 71-6-38 (June 7, 1971); CAB Order No.
71-7-116 (July 21, 1971).
4 Liability and Claims Rules and Practices Investigation, CAB Docket No.
19,923 et al., Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge John E. Faulk (served
July 23, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Initial Decision].
I CAB Order No. 73-8-33 (Aug. 8, 1973).
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I. SURFACE CARRIERS' STANDARD OF LIABILITY
At early common law, a carrier of goods was held liable for all
loss or injury to such goods except for that damage caused by
"Acts of God, and by the enemies of the King."' With the passage
of time, these exceptions were later broadened to include the fault
of the shipper, the acts of a public authority, and the inherent
nature or vice of the cargo." In practice, these exceptions were so
narrow that carriers were regarded as insurers of the goods en-
trusted to them.'
This theory of strict liability was first espoused in 1601, in the
case of Southcote v. Bennet,' where a gratuitous bailee" was held
liable for loss of goods even though the goods were stolen from
him. This rule was applied, with few exceptions, to all bailments
until Coggs v. Bernard," where a gratuitous bailee was sued for
damages incurred in moving a cask of brandy from one cellar to
another. In overruling the blanket approach set out in Southcote,
the court reviewed the whole field of bailments and laid down
several rules establishing varying degrees of care applicable to the
various types of bailments. When discussing the rule applicable to
the common carrier for hire, Lord Holt, speaking for the court,
pointed out that the carrier must answer for the goods at all times.
Lord Holt reasoned that if the law were otherwise, carriers could
conspire with thieves to swindle persons entrusting goods to such
carriers."
'Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112 (K.B. 1703).
7 See, e.g., Whitlock Truck Serv., Inc. v. Regal Drilling Co., 333 F.2d 488, 491
(10th Cir. 1964); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U.S. 416,
421 (1926).
' R. SIGMON, MILLER'S LAW OF FREIGHT Loss AND DAMAGE CLAIMS 5 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as LAW OF FREIGHT Loss].
'4 Coke 83b, Cro. Eliz. 815 (1601).
0 0 A bailee is a species of agent to whom something movable is committed in
trust for another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 718 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). A gratuitous
bailee is a bailee who performs such a service without receiving consideration.
1192 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
"To use Lord Holt's words:
The law charges this person thus entrusted to carry goods, against
all events, but Acts of God, and the enemies of the King. For
though the force be ever so great, as if an irresistible multitude of
people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable, . . .for else
these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all persons that
had any dealings with them by combining with thieves, etc., and
414
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In an effort to avoid or limit possible liability under this stand-
ard, carriers entered into various agreements often exchanging a
provision of limited liability for reduced transportation charges.
1
'
When judicially challenged, these agreements were upheld only if
they were reasonable and the consideration for limited liability was
in the form of lower shipping rates.' While carriers could limit their
potential exposure to damages in this manner, they could not alter
the common-law standard of strict liability by inserting exculpatory
provisions or clauses whereby the carrier would stipulate against
damages or losses resulting from his own negligence. 5 One of the
basic purposes underlying this rule was to insure that the carrier
performed his duties with the utmost care and diligence. 6 Probably
more important, however, was the fact that the courts began to
recognize the unequal bargaining position held by the shipper and
yet doing it in such clandestine manner as would not be possible to
be discovered. And this is the reason the law is founded upon that
point.
Id. at 112.13 Initially, common carriers sought to escape their extraordinary liability by
publication of notices to the effect that their liability would be limited to indicated
amounts unless the shipper elected to pay a higher rate which would impose upon
the carrier the assumption of greater liability. By the posting of these notices,
the common carriers hoped the courts would consider that knowledge of the con-
ditions under which the goods would be carried would be brought home to the
owner and by custom would become part of the transportation contract. Even
though this was a loose arrangement, the courts early recognized that it was suffi-
cient to limit the carriers' liability when there was reason to believe that notice
had been brought to the attention of the shipper or reasonably should have been
known to him. LAw OF FREIGHT LOSS, supra note 8, at 5-6. See also Smith, Con-
tractual Limitations in Commercial Transactions, 12 HAsT. L.J. 122 (1960).
"ISee Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913); Hart v. Penn.
R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884); New York Cent. R.R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357
(1873).
1"See note 13 supra; Kansas City So. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639 (1913); Santa
Fe, P.&P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co., 228 U.S. 177 (1913). See also Bickle,
Agreed Valuation as Affecting the Liability of Common Carriers, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 32 (1907).6 This policy was set out in New York Cent. R.R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357
(1873), and was reaffirmed in Santa Fe, P.&P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co.,
228 U.S. 177 (1913), when the Court noted:
The rule rests on broad grounds of public policy, justifying the re-
striction of liberty of contract because of the public ends to be
achieved. The great object of the law governing common carriers
was to secure the utmost care in the rendering of a service of the
highest importance to the community. A carrier who stipulates not
to be bound to the exercise of care and diligence "seeks to put off
the essential duties of his employment."
Id. at 184-85 (emphasis is by the court).
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recognizing such, sought to protect him.1 ' In New York Central
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 8 the Court pointed out that the indi-
vidual shipper could challenge the carrier's practices but only at
the risk of going out of business."
Recognition of this inequality as well as the fact that railroads
had a virtual monopoly on the transportation field caused Congress
to enact the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887." Standing alone,
this legislation failed to improve the plight of the shipper; carriers
continued to limit their liability, often relying on varying interpre-
tations of state law or policy.2 1 In an effort to create some uniform
treatment in this regard, the Carmack Amendment" was passed
in 1906, taking away from the initial carrier its right to limit its
liability by contract and, at the same time, making connecting car-
riers the agents of the initial carrier. These measures provided the
claimant with a more convenient way of meeting the burden of
proving which carrier was responsible." While the shipper was
aided by the Carmack Amendment, the Supreme Court continued
to recognize the carrier's right to limit its liability in return for
lower shipping rates." Therefore, in 1915, Congress passed the
first Cummins Amendment, ' which imposed liability on the carrier
for full loss or damage caused by it or any connecting carrier
" See Santa Fe, P.&P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 185
(1913). See also New York Cent. R.R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (1873), where
the Court in discussing the plight of the individual shipper noted:
[The customer] is only one individual of a million. He cannot afford
to higgle or stand out and seek redress in the courts. . . . He
prefers, rather, to accept any bill of lading, or sign any paper the
carrier presents; often, indeed, without knowing what the one or the
other contains. In most cases he has no alternative but to do this,
or abandon his business.
Id. at 379.
18 17 Wall. 357 (1873).
"See note 17 supra.
"Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
21 LAW OF FREIGHT Loss, supra note 8, at 14.
"This amendment, ch. 3591, § 7, 55 11-12, 34 Stat. 595 (1906), which is
presently codified in 49 U.S.C. § 20 55 11-12 (1970), provided at the time of
its enactment that any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
would be liable for all loss, damage or injury to property which it had received
for transportation and furthermore, no contract, receipt, rule or regulation would
be allowed to exempt the common carrier from the liability imposed.
'LAW OF FhEIGHT Loss, supra note 8, at 14-15.
'Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
"Cummins Amendment, ch. 176, 38 Stat. 1196 (1915).
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regardless of any contrary agreement. To modify the harshness of
this rule, the first Cummins Amendment was itself amended!6 a
year later so as to provide that carriers might lawfully limit their
liability by establishing and maintaining a system of "released
rates"" which were to be authorized by and filed with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC).
The rapid development of motor vehicles as a mode of carriage
caused Congress to extend this regulatory scheme to highway trans-.
portation in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.8 To insure uniform
standards of liability for all surface carriers, Congress simply pro-
vided that section 20, paragraph 1129 of the Interstate Commerce
Act would apply to motor carriers as well as rail carriers." As a
result, all surface carriers today are subject to a standard of strict
liability (with the generally recognized common-law exceptions)2 '
except where the ICC has specifically approved "released" rates.
26 Cummins Amendment, ch. 301, 39 Stat. 441 (1916).
27 In general, the "released rate" system permits the establishment of rates
based upon the declared or released value of the property transported, which
value thus becomes the measure of the carrier's maximum liability. This system
will be discussed more fully later in the text. See text accompanying notes 55-71
infra.
21 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
2 9 See text accompanying note 56 infra.
"The Interstate Commerce Act provides:
The provisions of section 20(11) and (12) of this title, together
with such other provisions of chapter I of this title (including pen-
alties) as may be necessary for the enforcement of such provisions,
shall apply with respect to common carriers by motor vehicle with
like force and effect as in the case of those persons to which such
provisions are specifically applicable.
49 U.S.C. S 319 (1970).
31The common-law exceptions are: Acts of God, fault of the shipper, acts of
public authorities, inherent nature or vice of the cargo, and war-time acts. See
text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
11 See note 27 supra. The Uniform Commercial Code has a somewhat limited
application in this particular area. U.C.C. § 7-309 provides:
(1) A carrier who issues a bill of lading whether negotiable or
non-negotiable must exercise the degree of care in relation to the
goods which a reasonably careful man would exercise under like
circumstances. This subsection does not repeal or change any law or
rule of law which imposes liability upon a common carrier for dam-
ages not caused by its negligence.
U.C.C. S 7-309 (1972 version) (emphasis added). U.C.C. 5 7-309(2) sets forth
the contractual limitation of the carrier's liability. The Official Comment, how-
ever, points out that this section is a generalized version of the Interstate Com-
merce Act provisions regarding the same. Furthermore, section 7-103 of the Code
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IE. AIR CARRIERS' STANDARD OF LIABILITY
While railroads have been regulated since 1887, the airplane
was first comprehensively regulated less than thirty years ago with
the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.' This regu-
lation was enacted in order to bring stability, uniformity, and
safety to a rapidly developing industry which was supposedly
plagued with cut-throat competition, economic instability, and un-
safe operating conditions." Proponents of this regulation argued
that the airline had the characteristics of a natural monopoly and
could be analogized to the railroads which had been regulated for
over fifty years.' While this line of argument was made, problems
and characteristics unique to air travel caused Congress to adopt
a somewhat different approach, at least with regard to liability
provisions."
recognizes the controlling nature of any statute or tariff which might conflict with
the provisions of the Code.
"3Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938). Note, how-
ever, that congressional investigation of aviation began as early as 1918. R.
CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 123 (1962).
"For a discussion of the historical arguments behind the regulation of the
air transportation industry, see Comment, An Examination of Traditional Argu-
ments on Regulation of Domestic Air Transport, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 187 (1976).
nId. at 194. See also Lloyd-Jones, De-regulation and Its Potential Effect on
Airline Operations, 41 J. Ant L. & CoM. 815, 834-39 (1975), in which the author
asserts that although the airlines are not a natural monopoly, there are sufficient
similarities to natural monopolies to justify regulation.
30See Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951), in
which the court of appeals discussed this difference and the basic underlying ra-
tionale, as follows:
A primary purpose of the Civil Aeronautics Act is to assure uni-
formity of rates and services to all persons using the facilities of air
carriers. . . . To achieve this, it is essential, in the judgment of
Congress, that a single agency, rather than numerous courts under
diverse laws, have primary responsibility for supervising rates and
services. . . . Accordingly, this broad regulatory scheme, and not
the common law, must govern the contract of the parties. [citing
authorities]
In its purpose, as in its general statutory provisions, the Civil
Aeronautics Act is similar to the Interstate Commerce Act .... The
latter, however, contains an express provision prohibiting exemption
from liability for any loss or damage to baggage caused by the
carrier, regardless of negligence, but permitting reasonable valuation
agreements to limit that liability. . . . The absence of a similar
provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act compels the conclusion that
such an exemption is not forbidden to air carriers, and that the
Board could properly accept the appellee's tariff.
Id. at 941.
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The statute governing the airline industry today-the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (Act)----does not establish any standard of
liability whatsoever. In fact, air carriers have traditionally been
able to effectively establish their own standard of care by filing a
tariff with the Civil Aeronautics Board. Absent a CAB finding
that such tariff is unreasonable or unjust, the tariff as submitted
conclusively controls the rights and liabilities between airlines and
shippers or passengers.' More specifically, section 403(a)" of
the Act requires every domestic and foreign air carrier to file
tariffs showing not only the rates, fares, and charges for air trans-
portation but also showing all classifications, rules, regulations,
practices, and services in connection with such transportation.'
But see Odom v. Pacific N. Airlines, Inc., 393 P.2d 112 (Alas. 1964), in
which the Supreme Court of Alaska, refusing to recognize the filed tariff as ex-
culpating the defendant airlines from liability, noted:
While the rule thus established in Lichten has been followed in
several other jurisdictions, since it has never been passed upon by
the Supreme Court of the United States, we do not propose to adopt
it as the law of Alaska, the reason being we are more firmly per-
suaded by Judge Frank ....
Judge Frank, the dissenting judge in Lichten, discussed the development of federal
common law and concluded that an airline was not different from other common
carriers in that it cannot, he argued, limit its "common-law liability" by special
contract. 189 F.2d 939, 942-45 (dissenting opinion). The decision in Odom has
been severely questioned in Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360, 366
(S.D. Fla. 1972), but has not been overruled as the law in Alaska.
37 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. S 1301 et seq. (1970), formerly Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
:8 Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
5949 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970):
Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the
Board ... tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air trans-
portation between points served by it ... and showing to the extent
required by regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules, regu-
lations, practices, and services in connection with such air transpor-
tation. Tariffs shall be filed, posted, and published in such form
and manner, and shall contain such information, as the Board shall
by regulation prescribe; and the Board is empowered to reject any
tariff so filed which is not consistent with this section and such reg-
ulations. Any tariff so rejected shall be void.
40 The Act further provides that it is the duty of every air carrier to establish,
observe and enforce just and reasonable rules, regulations, classifications, and prac-
tices with regard to such transportation. See 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1970). Typ-
ically, tariffs are filed with the CAB by agents representing several airlines. When
the Initial Decision of the AL was handed down in 1973, the tariff filed by Air-
line Tariff Publishers, Inc., agent, on behalf of American, Braniff, Delta, Eastern,
TWA, and others was known as Official Air Freight Rules Tariff No. 1-B, CAB
No. 96 (Aug. 19, 1972). At issue in the administrative proceedings was a part
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As mentioned, these filed tariffs constitute the controlling contract
between the parties whether they be shippers or passengers. 1 Where
the parties execute a special contract for transportation, any clauses
or terms inconsistent with the carrier's tariff are invalid and un-
enforceable,' regardless of the passenger's or shipper's lack of
knowledge or assent to such terms.' Thus, when baggage is lost or
freight is damaged, the disposition of any claim is controlled by
the applicable tariff rules and regulations.
I Historically, airlines have filed tariffs containing exculpatory
clauses whereby the airlines would disavow all responsibility for
certain specified items, regardless of the fault determination." The
tariffs under which several airlines operated prior to the Initial
Decision handed down in 1973, contained an exculpatory provi-
sion which required a finding that the airline was actually negligent
of the above tariff known as Rule 30(B) [hereinafter cited in text as "Original
Rule 30"] which controlled the carriers' liability.
41See Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1961); see
also Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972), afl'd, 477
F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 413
F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969).
'Emery Air Freight Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1255 (Ct. Cl. 1974);
Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1097 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
"Mao v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844 (D.C.N.Y. 1970); Mus-
tard v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 338 Mass. 674, 156 N.E.2d 696 (1959); but
note, in order to alleviate the harshness of such a rule in the passenger context,
the CAB has established certain requirements. In the Baggage Liability Rules
Case, 45 C.A.B. 182, 188 (1966), the CAB recognized that signs posted at ticket
counters advising passengers of tariff limitations were inadequate to fully inform
the average traveler of the legal implications. In that proceeding, however, the
CAB refused to prescribe what notice was adequate, instead relying on the
ordered increase in the liability ceiling (see note 119 infra) to reduce the number
of persons adversely affected by lack of notice. The CAB did respond in 1972
and prescribed by 14 C.F.R. § 221.76 the requirements that if a carrier wished
to avail itself of the limited liability, it must: (1) display "conspicuously" at each
ticket selling location and baggage checking location a sign giving notice of its
limited liability and (2) include a notice of limited liability for baggage on each
ticket.
"See, e.g., Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951),
where the tariff in issue provided in part:
[N]o participating carrier shall be liable for the loss of, or any
damage to, or any delay in the delivery of, any property of the
following types which is included in a passenger's baggage, whether
with or without the knowledge of the carrier: fragile or perishable
articles, money, jewelry, silverware, negotiable paper, securities,
or other valuables, samples, or business documents; or any other




before a shipper or passenger could recover.' Under this portion
of the tariff, known as Original Rule 30, shippers or passengers
were required to prove that the damage or loss occurred while in
the airline's possession. The ALJ found this rule unreasonable and
therefore unlawful on the grounds that a carrier should not be able
to escape liability on the basis of facts peculiarly within his knowl-
edge.'
In the CAB review proceeding, a rule was advanced by the
CAB's Bureau of Economics whereby the airline would be liable
if the cause of the damage or delay occurred at any time during the
transportation encompassed in the airway bill." Unsatisfied with
this rule as well as the rule handed down by the ALJ in the Initial
Decision, the CAB found both rules unreasonable and unlawful,
noting that neither would adequately protect the shipper." The
CAB, finally recognizing that the air carriers and shippers do not
occupy a position of equal bargaining power, prescribed a rule of
strict liability similar to that governing surface carriers."
-' The tariff provision, Original Rule 30, referred to in note 40 supra, is set out
fully in Liability Investigation, supra note 1, app. B, at 15-16, col. 2.
" Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 7.
17 This rule, generally referred to as the "due diligence" rule, had certain im-
portant exceptions whereby the carrier could avoid liability if it could prove that
it took all necessary measures to avoid the loss or that it was impossible to take
such measures. See Rule 30(B), Liability Investigation, supra note 1, app. B,
at 16-17, col. 2.
4 For example, the CAB pointed out that while the "due diligence" rule re-
quires the airline to establish that it exercised care, disputes will still result as to
the degree of care which it took or should have taken. Furthermore, the CAB
was concerned with the vagueness of the phrases "all necessary measures" and
"impossible for it to take such measures." Liability Investigation, supra note 1,
at 8-9.
" The CAB-ordered Rule 30 is as follows:
(A) Exlusions From Liability
(1) The carrier shall not be liable for loss, damage, delay, or other
result caused by:
(a) Acts of God, perils of the air, public enemies, public author-
ities acting with actual or apparent authority in the premises,
authority of law, quarantine, riots, strikes, civil commotions,
or hazards or dangers incident to a state of war.
(b) The act or default of the shipper or consignee.
(c) The nature of the shipment, or any defect, characteristic or
inherent vice thereof.(d) Violation by the shipper or consignee of any of the rules con-
tained in this tariff or other applicable tariffs, including, but
not confined to, improper or insufficient packing, securing,
marking, or addressing, and failure to observe any of the rules
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
III. MEASURE OF DAMAGE--SURFACE CARRIERS
As a result of the CAB's Liability Investigation, all common car-
riers, which heretofore had operated under different standards of
liability, are now strictly accountable for loss, damage, or delay of
any shipment of baggage or freight, subject to the common-law
exceptions previously discussed? The problem thus becomes how
to measure the damages which result from such liability. In gen-
eral contract law, compensatory damages are awarded on the
premise of placing the aggrieved party in the same economic posi-
tion he would have been in had the contract been performed."
While this objective is often obfuscated by the regulatory provisions
allowing for limitations of liability, the general purpose remains
the same?
When dealing with surface carriers regulated by the ICC, dam-
age recovery is tied to both the transportation contract, represented
by a bill of lading or receipt, and the tariff authorized by the ICC.
Section 20 paragraph 11 of the Interstate Commerce Act provides,
in part, as follows:
Any common carrier . . . (operating in interstate commerce)
... shall issue a receipt or bill of lading ... and shall be liable to
the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such
property caused by it or by any common carrier ... to which such
property may be delivered ... and no contract, receipt, rule, regu-
lation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall ex-
empt such common carrier . . . from the liability hereby imposed;
and any such common carrier shall be liable to the lawful holder
of said receipt or bill of lading . . . for the full actual loss, dam-
age, or injury to such property caused by it or by any such com-
mon carrier . . . (emphasis added)."
relating to shipments not acceptable for transportation or ship-
ments acceptable only under certain conditions.
(e) Compliance with delivery instructions from the shipper or
consignee or noncompliance with special instructions from the
shipper or consignee not authorized by applicable tariffs. CAB
Order No. 76-3-139 (Mar. 22, 1976).
5Id. See also Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112 (K.B. 1703); Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U.S. 416, 421 (1926); Whitlock
Truck Serv., Inc. v. Regal Drilling Co., 333 F.2d 488, 491 (10th Cir. 1964).
51 C. MCCORMICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 561 (2d
ed. 1952).
"Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Roe, 118 So. 155 (Fla. 1928).
'349 U.S.C. S 20(11) (1970).
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In the absence of "agreed value rates"M  or "released rates, ' the
court is often faced with a confusing and complexing fact determi-
nation as to exactly what is the "actual loss or damage." ' When
the transportation of goods is delayed, the general rule is that the
shipper may recover the difference in the market value of the goods
at the time and place when delivery should have been made and
their market value when delivery was actually made." This rule,
known as the "market value rule," is not applied blindly and uni-
formly in all cases of delay. The court must examine the facts of
the case and determine whether the rule most precisely measures
the actual loss or damage suffered.'
Typically, when property is lost or damaged or its transportation
is delayed wrongfully, the shipper incurs damages beyond the
market price of the goods. These special, or consequential, dam-
ages, first recognized in the landmark case of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale," are recoverable by a shipper only if the shipper, at or before
the time he tendered the goods to the carrier, informed the carrier
11 "Agreed value rates" or "actual value rates" are those rates imposed by the
carrier based upon the value of the goods agreed upon by shipper and carrier.
When such rates are utilized, the carrier is still liable for the "full actual loss or
damage" but the damages are awarded based upon, but not limited to, this agreed
value. See LAW OF FREIGHT Loss, supra note 8, at 308-09.
""Released rates," on the other hand, are the rates which must be authorized
by the ICC and published whereby the shipper can obtain a lower transportation
rate in exchange for the limitation of liability. See note 27 supra. See also LAw
OF FREIGHT Loss, supra note 8, at 350-62.
56 For example, in the case of loss of fungible goods, the court must decide
what is the proper valuation to use. See, e.g., Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Mc-
Caull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U.S. 97 (1919), where the Court found market value
at destination to be the proper measure. But see Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281
U.S. 57 (1930), where the Court found wholesale value at destination to be the
proper measure. See also International & G.N. Ry. v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 550
(1884), where the goods lost had no market value and, thus, were held to be
worth the actual value to the owner, taking into consideration such factors as the
property's cost, the practicability and expense of replacing it, and other factors
peculiar to the individual case; but not including any sentimental value. See also
Twersky v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 Misc. 300, 273 N.Y.S. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
For an excellent review of the traditional law of damages in this context, see Gore
Products, Inc. v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 34 So. 2d 418 (La. Ct. App. 1948).
" New York, L.E. & W. R.R. v. Estell, 147 U.S. 591 (1892); Mitsubishi Shoji
Kaisha v. Davis, 291 F. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 706 (1923).
6 See, e.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 333 F.2d
705 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1964), in which the court held for
the carrier on the grounds that even though there was a wrongful delay, the
shipper failed to establish actual loss.
" 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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of the special circumstances which rendered the prompt transporta-
tion and delivery necessary." Stated differently, "a person can only
be held responsible for such consequences as may be reasonably
supposed to be in contemplation of the parties at the time of the
making of the contract."" If sufficient notice is given, the courts
have not hesitated, in the case of surface carriers, to award a variety
of special damages."
The transportation of baggage, personal effects, and other house-
hold goods has been exposed to a somewhat different treatment
when questions of liability and damage arise. The general rule that
a carrier shall be liable for "full actual loss, damage, or injury"
has an exception, Section 20 (11 ) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 3
which permits the establishment of rates based upon the declared
or released values of the property, which then become the measure
of the carrier's maximum liability.
The released rate must be "expressly" authorized by the ICC.
Furthermore, a carrier's tariff filed pursuant to a released rate
order must, in order to be effective, contain specific reference to
6°Simons-Mayrant Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 207 F. 387 (D.S.C. 1913).
61 Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903).
"2 See, e.g., Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo.
App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932), where the carrier delayed shipment of part of
an oil-burning stove which it knew was to be exhibited at an industry-wide con-
vention. Due to the notice of special circumstances, the court awarded damages
including express charges to and from, hotel accommodations, and the cost of
renting space at the convention. See also H.C. Parker, Inc. v. Herrin Transp.
Co., 183 So. 606 (La. Ct. App. 1938), where the court awarded lost profits which
would have been made if a shipment of sample furniture had arrived on time.
"Section 20(11) provides in part as follows:
[T]he provisions hereof respecting liability for full actual loss, dam-
age, or injury ... shall not apply ... to property ... received for
transportation concerning which the carrier shall have been or shall
be expressly authorized or required by order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent
upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon
in writing as the released value of the property, in which case
such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than to
limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so
declared or released, and shall not, so far as relates to value, be
held a violation of section 10 of this title; and any tariff schedule
which may be filed with the Commission ...shall contain specific
reference thereto and may establish rates varying in value so de-
clared and agreed upon ....
49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970). For the applicability of the Uniform Commercial
Code in this area see note 34 supra.
COMMENTS
such released values." Mere publication of authorized released
rates inadequately protects the carrier's attempted liability limita-
tion. While such publication is required, the statute further re-
quires that values must either be "declared in writing by the ship-
per" or "agreed upon in writing as the released value of the prop-
erty." The fact that the statute not only requires the ICC to estab-
lish rates for transportation based on these declared or agreed values
but also recognizes the carrer's limited liability assures against two
otherwise possible consequences. One, the shipper is precluded
from understanding the value of his property for the purpose of re-
ducing the rate and then recovering a larger "actual" value in case
of loss." Two, the fact that either the shipper declares the value or
it is agreed upon prevents the carrier from arbitrarily fixing a low
value whereby it can limit its liability in a manner not prescribed
by statute nor allowed by common law."
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGE-AIR CARRIERS
Historically, recovery for lost, damaged, or delayed shipments in
the air carrier context has drastically differed from recovery in the
surface carrier context. The primary reason for the traditional dis-
tinction centers on the comprehensive regulatory scheme fashioned
by Congress. This regulation, by providing in general terms that
passenger and cargo are to be treated equally by air carriers, was
designed to insure that rates and services are offered on an equal
basis to all who seek to use such carriers, to protect the traveling
public, and to effectuate a rule of equality in the air transportation
industry."8
Recognizing that these objectives would be better served by a
standard of liability similar to that which surface carriers have to
meet, the CAB has established a standard of liability analogous
"Id.
as Id.
:'Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884).
67In re Released Rates, 13 I.C.C. 550 (1908). See also note 15 and accom-
panying text. For a general discussion of the use of "released" rates in the bag-
gage context, see Note, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 153 (1969).
"8 Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1967); see also Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d
939 (2d Cir. 1951).
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to that applicable to surface carriers." In addition to prescribing
this uniform standard of strict liability, the CAB has, by its action
in the Liability Investigation, altered its stance on the measure and
type of damage which passengers as well as shippers can now re-
cover. In general, blanket exculpations against special and conse-
quential damage were deemed unlawful."0 Furthermore, the CAB
found unlawful the present monetary limit rule which limited the
air carrier's out-of-pocket claim payments to the higher of fifty
cents per pound (applied to the weight of the shipment) or fifty
dollars, provided that a higher value was not declared and paid
for.7' These actions constitute a significant change from the rules
which have heretofore governed questions of the measure of dam-
ages recoverable by an injured shipper or passenger.
In the surface carrier context, questions of damages have largely
been controlled by common-law principles.' With the exception
of ICC approved "released" rates, Congress has recognized that
surface carriers are liable for the "full actual loss or damage." 3
When no "released" rates are approved, the measure of damages
becomes a question of fact as to the actual loss suffered." In con-
trast, it has been uniformly recognized that the rules of common
law and the traditional law of damages do not apply to similar
situations involving air carriers"' because of the pervasive regulatory
scheme enacted by Congress. In the aviation context, the role of
the judiciary is not to make a fact determination but to answer
questions of law involving the interpretation of tariffs filed with
" See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
70 Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 15.
71 Id. at 26. Note that the $500 per passenger limitation imposed by the CAB
in 1966, infra note 119, for baggage claims was not at issue in this proceeding.7
1 See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
73 See notes 32 and 56 supra and accompanying text.
74See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
"s Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972), afl'd,
477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 275
F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), afl'd, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969); Illinois
Produce Int'l, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Martin
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 280 A.2d 647 (1971); Mel-
nick v. National Airlines, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 316, 150 A.2d 566 (1959); Crosby
& Co., Inc. v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 76 Misc. 2d 990, 352 N.Y.S.2d
75 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 348 N.Y.S.2d 957, 42 App. Div. 2d 1050 (1973); Mustard
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 338 Mass. 674, 156 N.E.2d 696 (1959); Randolph v.
American Airlines, Inc., 103 Ohio App. 172, 144 N.E.2d 878 (1956); Rosenchein
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 349 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
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the CAB."6 These tariffs, required to be filed by virtue of section
403 of the Act," constitute the law between an air carrier and
shipper and not merely a contract." Limitation of liability con-
tained in tariffs properly filed with the CAB are binding upon the
shipper regardless of the fact that such limitations were not em-
bodied in the specific transportation contract or airbill." This re-
sult flows from the fact that once a tariff is filed with the CAB, it
constitutes the contract which governs the legal relationships of
the parties."' Shippers and passengers are "conclusively presumed"
to know the contents of such tariffs." Even if the specific transpor-
tation contract, whether it be a shipper's airbill, a passenger's
ticket, or some other document, contains limitations of liability
which conflict with those contained in the tariff on file with the
CAB, it is uniformly recognized that the provisions of the tariff are
controlling." Furthermore, in contrast to the surface carrier situa-
tion, the shipper's or passenger's lack of knowledge or assent to
such limitations does not alter the binding effect of such provi-
sions.
8 3
Consequently, the tariff system as provided for in the Act occu-
pies a position vastly different from that used by surface carriers.
As previously discussed, air carriers have traditionally been able
to file tariffs in which they could establish a ceiling on their maxi-
mum monetary liability." Limitation to this ceiling is of course
76 Emery Air Freight Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1255 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
"See Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
78 Blair v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973). Note that tariffs
properly filed with the CAB become part of the transportation contract even
though the passenger or shipper is unaware of the provisions. Hycel, Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Killian v. Frontier
Airlines, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 17 (D. Wyo. 1957).
" Mao v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Tishman
& Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969); Lichten v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
80 Berkman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Killian v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 17 (D. Wyo. 1957).
81 See note 43 supra.
"
2 See Emery Air Freight Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1255 (Ct. Cl.
1974); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1097 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
8 See note 43 supra.
"The CAB, in the Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 19 n.30, sum-
marized the contrasting positions of surface and air carriers with regard to "re-
leased" rates, as follows:
Under the system in effect for air freight since its inception, the
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altered if the shipper or passenger declares a higher value." Yet
problems often arise because travelers or shippers are either un-
aware of this option to declare a higher value or they feel it is not
necessary or economical."' Nevertheless, when their baggage is lost
or shipment delayed, they are precluded from recovering more than
is allowed by tariff even though the "actual loss or damage" is
much greater."
Prior to 1966, most tariffs contained provisions that the carrier
would not be responsible for certain kinds of items having a special
value, such as jewelry, money, and perishables." In 1966, however,
the CAB ruled that airlines could not thereafter refuse to accept
such valuable items for shipment as baggage. 8 The carriers argued
that if the passenger could include in his baggage a substantial
amount of cash, jewelry, or other valuables, he would be in a posi-
tion to fabricate large claims which the carrier could not verify."
Furthermore, the carriers argued, liability for such valuables would
require a change in the baggage handling procedures which would
quoted rate is itself referred to as a "released" (presumably low)
rate, the carrier being released from liability beyond that stated in
its tariff. The shipper's choice is to obtain greater protection by
declaring excess value and paying a higher rate. This differs from
the system in surface transportation under which the carrier is
normally liable to the full extent of the loss suffered by the shipper
and can offer a lower rate accompanied by reduced liability only
if this "released" rate is specifically authorized by the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
"When a shipper declares a higher value for goods to be shipped, he is
normally charged from 10¢ to 15¢ per $100 of declared excess value. In his
Initial Decision, the ALJ found the tariffs providing for a 15¢ charge to be un-
lawful but, on review, the CAB declined to so decide, pointing out that different
carriers have different experiences and, therefore, there is no need for a uniform
declared value fee. Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 35.
" The CAB has previously pointed out the possibility that many passengers
simply rely on the coverage their personal insurance policies afford and therefore
they often feel no need to declare excess value. Baggage Liability Rules Case, 45
C.A.B. 182, 200 (1966).
87 See, e.g., Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), where a passenger carrying $69,000.00 of jewelry samples which were
negligently given to a stranger was awarded only $100.00, the tariff limitation
in effect at the time. See also Berkman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 209 F.
Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), where a passenger claimed over $57,000.00, but re-
covered only $100.00 because of the tariff limitation.8 See note 44 supra.
" Baggage Liability Rules Case, 45 C.A.B. 182 (1966).
'Old. at 200.
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cause delay and inconvenience to the traveling public. 1 The CAB
found the evidence insufficient to support such arguments and pre-
scribed a rule requiring airlines to accept valuables, at least in
checked baggage.' Since that decision, the airlines have filed tariffs
placing numerous restrictions on the acceptance of excess value
items in an attempt to alleviate the risk which was previously ne-
gated by the exculpatory tariffs. 3
The recovery of special or consequential damages has tradition-
ally been another area in which air carriers have been able to limit
their liability contrary to the common-law principles governing
surface carriers. As the air transportation industry grew, extensive
federal regulation caused special liability rules to develop."' Most
tariffs filed have contained blanket exculpations for special or con-
sequential damages." Shippers have argued that such exculpations
were against public policy as well as the common-law rules of
damages." The courts, however, recognizing the CAB's power to
"Id. at 201.
92 The order with regard to excess value items read:
The limitation of liability of the respective carrier parties for loss
of, damage to, or delay in the delivery of money, jewelry, silver-
ware, negotiable papers, securities, business documents, samples,
paintings, antiques, artifacts, manuscripts, irreplaceable books or
publications, or other similar valuables in checked baggage, shall be
not less than the lawful limitation of liability for other personal
property (as found herein) issued by the respective carriers. A dec-
laration of value on such valuables in excess of the carrier's limita-
tion of liability for loss of, damage to, or delay in the delivery of,
such valuables, shall be accepted by the carrier when such valuable
articles are not included in checked baggage.
Id. at 208.
"For example, the CAB ruled that when a shipper declares a value of
$5,000.00 or more, a carrier is obligated to accept such a shipment only when the
shipper:
(1) makes advance arrangements not less than three hours before
tendering the shipment;
(2) tenders the shipment at a designated terminal area not more
than three hours prior to scheduled departure, unless the carrier is
providing pickup service; and
(3) if the carrier is not providing service, states in writing that the
consignee will accept delivery at the airport within three hours after
arrival.
Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 64.
"See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
'1 See, e.g., note 92 supra.
"See Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1951). See also
Randolph v. American Airlines, Inc., 103 Ohio App. 172, 144 N.E.2d 878 (1956).
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change such rules, have refused to accept such arguments."' Such
tariff limitations have been upheld even when the carrier had com-
plete notice of the special circumstances which gave rise to the
special damages suffered." In the surface carrier context, such
notice would normally have been sufficient to render a negligent
carrier liable for special and consequential damages if the court
determined that such damages were part of the "actual" damages
suffered."' Thus, while surface carriers have been subject to liability
for special or consequential damages since 1854,"' air carriers
have, until 1976, enjoyed the privilege of denying such damages
on the theory that Congress enacted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme whereby the CAB would sanction such actions when it was
deemed necessary for purposes of uniformity and protection of
an infant industry."1
As noted at the outset of this comment, the CAB, in the Lia-
bility Investigation concluded in 1976, radically altered its posi-
tion on the standard of liability now required of air carriers as well
as its heretofore uniform" assent to exculpation from liability for
"See Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973); Gellert
v. United Airlines, 474 F.2d 77, 80 (10th Cir. 1973), where liability for special
damages for gross negligence in handling the ramains of plaintiff's deceased wife
was denied on the basis of an exculpatory tariff; Milhizer v. Riddle Airlines, Inc.,
185 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Mich. 1960), afi'd, 289 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1961); Killian
v. Frontier Airlines, 150 F. Supp. 17 (D. Wyo. 1957), where plaintiff sought re-
covery of the cost of a plane ticket incurred in picking up flowers wrongfully
shipped to another city.
"8 See Bendersky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 18,123 (E.D. Pa.
1968), where a doctor claimed that because his bag containing his lecture notes
did not arrive on time, he suffered damages in the form of a lost lecture fee, an
injured reputation as a lecturer, and the impairment of obtaining future lecturing
engagements. See also Schiff v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1057 (D.
Mass. 1971), where a research specialist desiring to transport refrigerated goods
from the west coast to the east coast was assured by the carrier that proper
handling was available. When the goods arrived unrefrigerated and thereby dam-
aged, the specialist claimed $30,000.00 actual and consequential damages but was
awarded only the $50 tariff limitation.
11 See notes 60, 61, 62 supra and accompanying text.
'"This was the year Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854),
was decided.
101 See note 35 supra.
101 For one of the few times where an exculpatory tariff was not upheld, see
Pan American World Airways, Inc., Conditions and Related Traffic Regulations,
24 C.A.B. 575, 589 (1957), where the CAB found that a provision of the condi-
tion of carriage which disclaimed liability for consequential and special damages
was adverse to the public interest and was in contravention of the general law of
damages.
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special or consequential damages. 1 The shift in position began in
1973, when the ALU found the rule 30(B) (1) (d) "ship at your
own risk" prescription'" unreasonable. 1
During the hearings before the ALJ, various shippers and other
concerned entities advanced arguments upon which this change
was finally made." Shippers argued that abrogation of the com-
mon-law liability was not healthy for the growth of air freight and
should not be allowed by merely filing a tariff, but should be altered
by statute."" The Department of Defense argued that because of
the limited liability, some airlines found it economically more feas-
ible to ignore security measures rather than pay for strict security
enforcement.' The CAB's Bureau of Economics argued that ad-
vance notification by the shipper, in writing on the airbill, of the
value of the shipment would adequately protect the air carriers and
place them on notice of potential damages.'"
The carriers countered by arguing that CAB prescription of lia-
bility would deter initiative and competition in the development of
such rules."1 Second, the carriers contended that they would be
exposed to liaiblity of drastic proportions, totally unrelated to the
value of the shipment transported."' Finally, the carriers advanced
several theories regarding the practical improprieties for imposing
such a rule of liability." After weighing the arguments, the ALJ
10 Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 15.
'"Rule 30(B)(1)(d), in effect as of Feb. 3, 1973, read as follows: "The
carrier shall not be liable for any consequential or special damages whether or
not the carrier had knowledge that such damages might be incurred." Liability
Investigation, app. B, at 16, col. 2.
105 Initial Decision, supra note 4, at 22.
106 For an excellent discussion of the arguments raised, see Note, Consequen-
tial and Special Damages: Tempest in the Tariff, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 704 (1974).
107 Direct Exhibits and Testimony of the National Industrial Traffic League,
Exhibit NITL-T-I at 20, CAB Docket No. 19,923 et al. (July 14, 1972). Shippers
also argued that the lack of liability for such damages failed to reflect the public
nature of an air carrier's duties and disregarded the inequality in bargaining posi-
tions of shippers and carriers. Id. at 22.
100 Brief of the Department of Defense at 3, Initial Decision, supra note 4.
10 Direct Testimony of the Bureau of Economics, Exhibit BE-DT-1 19 at 7,
CAB Docket No. 19,923 et al. (May 1, 1972).
110 Brief of Joint Respondents at 10, Initial Decision, supra note 4.
"I Brief of Joint Respondents at 46, Initial Decision, supra note 4.
1 One of the practical problems argued was that notice of an excess value
item and potential for consequential damages would invite carriers to give prefer-
ential treatment to high risk shippers, a practice outlawed by the existing Official
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prescribed a rule whereby carriers must accept liability for special
or consequential damages, provided written notice is given by the
shipper, and also provided the damages do not exceed the carrier's
monetary limit."3
Upon review, the CAB summarily rejected the carrier's argument
of higher claims, labelling it "speculative.""" The CAB went further
and refused to accept the AL's prescribed rule on two grounds.
One, the carriers receive sufficient notice when a shipper declares
an excess value and pays the assessed fee.' Two, removal of the
written notice requirement would militate against the alleged
potential for preference, i.e., the carrier would be under no more
pressure to provide expeditious handling than it would with re-
spect to any declared value shipment." The CAB then concluded
that the "lawful rule" should read:
The carrier shall not be liable for special or consequential damages
where total damages (i.e., special or consequential damages com-
bined with any other damage for which the carrier is liable) would
exceed the carrier's normally assumed monetary liability as set
forth in Rule 32, unless a higher value is declared on the airbill
and the additional transportation charge assessed by the carrier is
paid. In no event shall the carrier's liability for special or conse-
quential damages exceed such higher declared values."'
Now that the air carrier is strictly accountable for all types of
damages, the important issue becomes to what extent the carrier
will have to pay for such liability. In the absence of a higher de-
clared value, the tariff limitation prior to the Liability Investiga-
Air Freight Rules Tariff No. 1-B, CAB No. 96, Rule 46(A) which provides that
"All shipments are subject ... to available space after accommodating passen-
gers, air mail and air express, and the carrier will determine on a reasonable and
not unjustly discriminatory basis, the priority of carriage as between shipments."
11' The AL's rule read:
The carrier shall not be liable for any consequential or special dam-
ages unless the carrier is so notified in advance in writing upon the
airbill, and, where such damages would exceed the carriers' assumed
liability as set forth in Rule 32, unless a greater valuation is de-
clared on the airbill and an additional transportation charge on such
declaration is assessed in accordance with Rule 32.
Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 12 n.20.
114 Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 14.
1Id. at 16.
"'Id. See also note 113 supra.
'
1 Id. at 16.
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tion provided that a shipper was limited to a recovery of the higher
of fifty cents per pound or fifty dollars. 18 In the passenger/baggage
context, the special limitation of not more than $500 per passenger
was the rule until recent CAB action increased the ceiling to $750
per passenger."' The passenger baggage limitation was not at issue
in the Liability Investigation, yet the CAB relied on one basic
principle set forth in the Baggage Liability Rules Case,"2' where the
$500 limitation was prescribed, in order to find the present fifty
cents/fifty dollars rule of freight shipments unreasonable. In that
proceeding, the CAB held that the monetary limitation must be
reasonably related to the value of the commodities in air transporta-
tion.1"1 In addition, the CAB considered a statistical survey in
which it was found that a large percentage of amounts claimed by
shippers were not recovered under the fifty cents/fifty dollars limi-
tation.1"" Shippers also complained that carriers provide poor se-
curity because of the preference to pay claims at fifty cents per
pound rather than update security measures. " The CAB dis-
counted this incentive theory somewhat and relied heavily on the
fact that the fifty cents/fifty dollars limitation had been adopted
in 1946, based on surface carrier rates used in the year 1861.
Furthermore, it pointed out that the air freight industry was no
longer an "infant" industry which needed the protection of such
" See Rule 52, Liability Investigation, supra note 1, app. B, at 26.
"I' Prior to 1966, there was a $250 per passenger limitation, but this limitation
was increased to $500 per passenger by order of the CAB in the Baggage Liability
Rules Case, 45 C.A.B. 182 (1966). The per passenger limitation was raised to
$750 in 1977 in the Domestic Baggage Liability Rules Investigation, CAB Docket
No. 27,589, Order No. 77-2-9 (Feb. 2, 1977). Inflation and the failure to com-
pensate passengers, as a practical matter, for a variety of consequential damages
were the two main reasons cited for the increase.
120 Baggage Liability Rules Case, 45 C.A.B. 182 (1966).
22 See Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 19, 20. The CAB did not, how-
ever, accept the principal that the test in this regard was whether the limitation
covers "all but the unusual or extraordinary cases." The AU had cited this test,
originally formulated in the Baggage Liability Rules Case, 45 C.A.B. 182, 187
(1966), but the CAB found such a criterion unnecessary and therefore refused
to accept it.
1"2See Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 21. To provide information
concerning the rule's operation, the CAB requested carriers to file specific data
for the period Sept. - Oct., 1971. From this survey it was found that only from
59% to 68% of all amounts claimed were recovered by shippers.
10 Id. at 25.
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inequitable limitations."H As required by Section 1002(d)"u of the
Act, the CAB then prescribed an interim rate of $9.07 per pound,
the current limit recognized in international air transportation. '
As to what the "lawful rule" should eventually be, the CAB re-
served decision until there was sufficient actual experience upon
which to base such a determination."'
V. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of its opinion in the Liability Investigation,
the CAB noted that the examination at hand represented the CAB's
first comprehensive look at air carrier rules and practices with re-
spect to freight liability and claims. If one looks at some of the
changes prescribed by the CAB as a result of such examination,
one might readily conclude that such an effort was long overdue.
Air carriers in 1976 were operating under liability limitations
124 Id. at 26. In support of its position, the CAB noted that the domestic
revenue ton-miles (a measurement of the extent of air freight shipments) in-
creased from 12.8 million in 1946, to over 1.4 billion ton-miles in 1976.
1
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. S 1482(d) (1970):
Whenever . . . the Board shall be of the opinion that any indivi-
dual or joint rate, fare, or charge . .. for ... air transportation, or
any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate,
fare, or charge, or the value of the service thereunder, is or will be
unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly prefer-
ential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board shall determine and pre-
scribe the lawful rate, fare, or charge ... thereafter to be demand-
ed . . . or the lawful classification, rule, regulation, or practice there-
after to be made effective ....
12 Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, formally known as the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), provides that in the case of checked
baggage and goods, the liability of the carrier is limited to 250 francs per kilo-
gram (approx. $9.07 at the time of the Liability Investigation), unless a higher
value was declared and paid for at the time the package was handed over to the
carrier. For a general discussion of limited liability under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, see Note, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 771 (1970). See also Parker, The Adequacy
of the Passenger Liability Limitation of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, 14 J.
AIR L. 37 (1947); Clare, Evaluation of Proposals to Increase the Warsaw Con-
vention Limit of Passenger Liability, 16 J. AIR L. 53 (1949); Hyman, Inadequacy
of Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Convention, 1952 INS. L.J. 533.
2" Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 29-30. Note that Hawaiian Airlines
requested that it be permitted to retain the current 5001$50 limit on the grounds
that Hawaiian intrastate freight traffic differs from the mainland traffic, and on
the grounds that the present limit provided adequate coverage of its claims. The
CAB found no compelling reason for such a request and disallowed the request
on the ground that the rule described is the minimum lawful rule for U.S. carriers
in all fifty states. Id. at 3 1.
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adopted in but unchanged since 1946. Tariffs filed by airlines,
although subject to review by the CAB, have contained exculpatory
provisions based upon assumptions formulated when the air trans-
port industry was truly an "infant" industry. Yet those assump-
tions have little validity in the rapidly changing economy of today.
Air carriers are no longer in need of the degree of protection that
was afforded them in the earlier years of development.
More particularly, the CAB has apparently recognized that sur-
face carriers and air carriers do not occupy significantly different
positions with regard to the shipment of goods to justify the here-
tofore differing rules, of liability. All common carriers-both air
and surface-are now subject to a standard of strict liability.
Shippers can now recover special and consequential damages re-
gardless of which type of carrier they are forced to use. Of course,
air carriers are still allowed to limit their ultimate monetary lia-
bility, but not at 1946 rates.
Without increasing the recovery rates, the CAB's action in this
area of liability would not have been so significant. The true eco-
nomic impact of these changes depends upon the persuasive ability
of the carriers to justify the need for a related freight rate in-
crease.12 The Liability Investigation did not encompass this issue 2
and as such, only future experience can define the true impact of
these changes. Shippers hope the increased liability exposure will
force airlines to adopt tighter and more efficient security measures.
On the surface, this appears to be a logical result. That, however,
depends upon the success of the carriers in obtaining the higher
freight rates which they argue are necessary in order to implement
more stringent security measures.
Finally, while future experience will determine many of the
potential effects of the recent changes in liability rules, there are
a few certain results. First, air shippers no longer have the burden
of showing negligence either in the actual transport of the freight
or in the system maintained to assure such transportation. Second,
air carriers will be forced to improve the efficiency of delivering
freight promptly or else answer for possible claims of special dam-
128 At the time the Liability investigation decision was rendered, the CAB was
also involved in deciding questions of adjustment of freight rates in Domestic Air
Freight Rate Investigation, CAB Docket No. 22,859 (Dec. 8, 1970).
12' Liability Investigation, supra note 1, at 5.
1977]
436 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [43
ages. And lastly, the shipper will not be forced to accept tariff
regulations which have heretofore drastically differed from the
corresponding requirements imposed on surface carriers. As a re-
sult of these changes, the air carrier no longer enjoys the preferred
status of a protected "infant," but instead, it can now be truly con-
sidered a common carrier, subject to the general rules, of liability
which are finally somewhat uniform.
